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Introduction
 Recent years have brought the Colombian government 
a string of notable successes against the country’s armed 
insurgencies: the ejection of the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) from large swathes of 
the countryside and the progressive desertion of hundreds of 
its fi ghters and leaders; the disarming and disbanding of the 
rightwing paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC); and the effective neutralization of the Ejército de 
Liberacion Nacional (ELN) as a fi ghting force. The same 
period has seen Colombia’s economic growth accelerate 
to sustained levels of between 5 and 8 percent per year, 
outstripping its Latin American neighbors. Commentators’ 
enthusiasm has grown with the government’s remarkable 
string of successes and luck — the rescue of prominent 
kidnapee Ingrid Betancourt and the deaths of the FARC’s 
leader and another senior commander. Some even predict 
Colombia’s transformation into a Latin American “tiger,” 
with growth and industrialization rising to Chinese levels 
in the coming years. At a time when Colombia’s future looks 
more prosperous and less violent than its past, it is useful to 
ask how good things can get for Colombia. Could the lifting 
of the “war tax” transform its economic prospects? What 
additional reforms would be needed for Colombia to attain 
Chinese-style rapid development? 
 While ending the violence is an historic achievement in 
its own right, claims that peace will lead naturally to rapid 
development should be viewed with a skeptical eye. The end 
of any war will, of course, liberate resources for productive 
investment and signifi cantly reduce the economic and 
human costs of violence. International experience shows 
that ending insurgencies can add modestly to a country’s 
economic growth during the fi rst years of peace. Such gains 
are not trivial, but they are a long way from Chinese growth 
rates of 9-10 percent per year, sustained over a generation. 
Chinese-style growth doubles GDP every nine years; more 
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than 400 million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty 
since market reforms began in 1978. What, in addition 
to bringing about peace, could a country like Colombia 
do to accelerate growth into the medium and long term? 
To answer this question, I review the growing consensus 
among development theorists about the central role that 
institutions play in determining development outcomes and 
then analyze the key institutional reforms that researchers 
now think drove China’s (and India’s) transformation from 
an impoverished agrarian economy to the home of the 
fastest development in human history. I begin with a quick 
review of what empirical studies have taught us, and what 
they have not taught us, about economic growth.
The Poverty of Cross-Country Studies and 
the Richness of Institutions
 For the past 25 years, the main tool that economists 
have used to investigate the determinants of growth is cross-
country regressions. This involves collecting time-series 
data for a large number of countries (or, less often, regions) 
and then searching for factors that correlate with economic 
growth. Increasingly sophisticated means are used to infer 
causality from, say, investment levels, literacy rates or trade 
policy to economic growth. 
 Some of the principal problems with this approach 
were pointed out as long ago as 1994, in an article by 
Robert Solow, widely considered to be the father of growth 
theory. Solow’s critiques were more recently revisited by 
Kenny (2007, 2001), who found their power undiminished. 
International cross-country growth regressions, the two 
authors maintain, have taught us little about economic 
growth because the techniques they employ suffer from 
a series of fundamental problems. The fi rst of these is 
the problem of omitted variables. Even for well studied 
episodes of growth in a particular country, researchers have 
at best an incomplete notion of why growth accelerated 
or decelerated, and disagreements among economists 
abound. The possibility that a single regression equation 
can capture all of the relevant factors across a wide variety 
of countries, over many years, is not high. That would be 
the case even if some of the more complex historical and 
cultural variables posited as explanatory factors were well 
measured, which they are not. Hence it is likely that factors 
important for explaining growth across many countries are 
not well-accounted for in these regression results, and thus 
the insights they provide are poor. 
 A second problem is the possibility of reverse causality. 
Researchers use lagged values, instrumental variables 
and a number of more sophisticated approaches to try to 
determine the direction of causality between the different 
variables in their regressions. But this is diffi cult to do across 
heterogeneous countries and long periods of time, especially 
when some of the most important indicators are, at best, 
proxies for the variables they seek to measure. Researchers 
have made some progress in this direction over the past 25 
years, but unfortunately we still cannot be certain that, for 
example, it is investment that increases economic growth 
and not the other way around. A third problem, as studies 
by Levine and Reinelt (1992) and Levine and Zervos (1992) 
point out, is that the results from cross-country regressions 
are highly sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables. 
Modest changes in the set of explanatory variables lead 
to the collapse of key causal relationships posited by the 
regressions.
 Most damning of all is Solow’s rejection of the attempt 
to statistically model the experiences of very different 
countries — with different histories, institutions and 
geographies — as if they represented discrete points on a 
well-defi ned surface. Cross-country regressions in effect 
posit a single growth process operating across all countries, 
where each national experience is a particular manifestation 
of the process. Such models seem at best improbable, an 
impression bolstered by the fragility of the results they have 
produced thus far. Indeed, empirical evidence over the past 
decade implies the opposite: economic growth is probably 
not a linear process featuring stable relationships amongst 
a relatively small number of variables. Rather, growth is 
highly context-specifi c, featuring relationships among key 
variables that change over time and particular causes that 
produce effects unreliably. Put crudely, different things 
work in different countries at different times. This is in large 
part why grand theories of development continually fail. 
 Recent years have seen a departure from the simple, 
linear universalism of growth regressions, towards deeper 
studies of particular country experiences. Rodrik’s volume 
In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic 
Growth (2003) is a prominent case in point. Such research 
underlines that the lack of a robust universal theory of 
growth is not equivalent to a lack of understanding about 
growth. Quite the opposite. 
The Role of Institutions
 The past decade has seen a new wave of research on 
the institutional determinants of growth (e.g. Acemoglu, 
Robinson & Johnson 2001; Sokoloff & Engerman 2000), 
which has provided a great deal of evidence on the 
importance of “institutions” for a country’s long-term 
development. What exactly are these institutions? Some 
of the most important features of a country’s institutional 
context include: (i) the degree of civic rights that all citizens 
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enjoy; (ii) the degree of political rights for that all citizens 
enjoy; (iii) the extent to which all individuals’ property 
rights are guaranteed. Empirical evidence shows that such 
factors are strongly correlated with economic outcomes 
and that the effects of institutions persist for centuries. 
Institutions appear to be potent drivers of economic growth 
and of development more broadly. 
 This literature does not endorse a particular form 
of government or laws. Different institutional forms can 
produce the constellation of rights and freedoms outlined 
above. Where they exist, there exists a state of laws and not 
of men, where individuals are protected from the arbitrary 
actions of others and are free to develop themselves and 
their potential. 
 Such institutions will sound attractive to many readers 
on a number of grounds. But why should they be associated 
with economic growth? Because they are inclusive. In 
both the economy and in politics, institutions based on 
equality among individuals and the inclusion of all in the 
national life tend to increase investment and innovation in 
the long run. Institutions that exclude certain individuals 
or groups tend to impoverish a country by restricting 
the ideas, energies and resources available to a nation’s 
economy and politics. Inclusive institutions contribute to 
economic growth and to the development of a nation. The 
implications for development are doubly strong because 
the institutional characteristics outlined above are a large 
part of our defi nition of what development is (see e.g. Sen 
1999). 
 Our discussion thus far operates at a high level of 
generality. How specifi cally can a developing country move 
in the direction of the institutions outlined above? And 
can such reforms really affect growth? To answer these 
questions, we consider the recent development successes of 
India and, especially, China. 
Institutions for Development: A Generation 
of Rapid Growth in China and India
 In a 2008 study, Bosworth and Collins show that China’s 
economic growth has averaged 9.3 percent per year between 
1978 and 2004. More surprisingly, they also document that 
India’s rapid growth did not begin after liberalizing reforms 
in 1991, but rather in 1978, alongside China’s (although 
growth did accelerate after 1993). 
 >>
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Economic growth in China and India
Country Period Average Yearly Growth
China 1978-2004 9.3%
India 1978-2004
  (1993-2004)
5.4%
6.5%
 
 The authors’ growth accounting exercise shows that in 
both cases growth was due mostly to increases in output per 
worker and not to increases in the number of workers. Worker 
output, in turn, increased mostly because of improvements 
in total factor productivity as opposed to increases in the 
capital stock. This is important because it means that 
both economies became more effi cient over time, and the 
increasing wealth that each country enjoys is due more to 
effi ciency gains than to increased inputs. Indeed, India’s 
gains in total factor productivity are quite comparable to 
those of the East Asian “Tigers” in their heyday (1960-80), 
while China’s gains in total factor productivity are three 
times as large. 
 How did India’s and, especially, China’s workers 
become so much more productive? Of the various factors 
that Bosworth and Collins indicate, three stand out: 
• Sustained increases in the coverage and quality of 
education, especially in China;
• Notable improvements in infrastructure;
• In China: Sizable internal migration that transfers 
underemployed human resources from rural to urban 
areas, where their productivity tends strongly to 
increase. 
Chinese schoolchildren.
Photo by Steven Yuen-Pak Liu.
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 All three factors are notable for increasing the 
inclusiveness of each country’s economy and polity. An 
extensive, good quality public education system is a necessary 
prerequisite if ordinary citizens are to have full access to 
economic opportunities, political debate and social and 
cultural interactions more broadly defi ned. Infrastructure 
also serves the cause of inclusiveness by decreasing transport 
and communication costs and improving people’s access to 
places, goods and ideas. And in China, migration was the 
means for millions to join the modern economy. 
 Two well-known social science facts are that economic 
growth is socially disruptive, and institutional reform is 
politically disruptive. How, then, did China manage such 
deep institutional reforms and then the sustained, rapid 
growth that followed? What tools did they use to get the 
effects they achieved? Qian (2005) identifi es four “transition 
institutions” that played a key role in China’s reform process. 
The fi rst of these was the dual-track price system, under 
which fi xed quantities of goods were produced and allocated 
at fi xed prices under the old planning system. But at same 
time, a market track was introduced in which prices and 
quantities were determined by free market mechanisms for 
all quantities above the plan. The aggregate effect was that 
prices were liberalized at the margin, while inframarginal 
prices and quantities were maintained for some time before 
being phased out. This was a way to implement reform that 
cushioned losers. The command economy continued to 
provide basic items at low prices.  Once production quotas 
were fi lled, additional production — and consumption — 
could occur at prices and quantities set by free supply and 
demand.
 China’s well-known Township-Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) formed a second type of transition institution. 
These created decentralized “private” fi rms in a command 
economy context devoid of private property rights, where 
there was no guarantee of control over assets or cash fl ow. 
Placing TVEs under the control of local authorities gave local 
offi cials access to expanded future revenue streams from a 
growing economy. This in turn created strong incentives 
for local authorities to invest in public goods. Anticipating 
this, the central government left larger budget residuals for 
local governments to invest. In this way, reform created a 
virtuous and self-sustaining circle of devolution, investment 
and growth. 
 A third transition institution was fi scal federalism. 
Before reform of central–provincial relations, central 
government extracted 80 percent of increases in provincial 
revenues. After reform, provinces kept the lion’s share 
of increases. This gave provincial governments strong 
incentives to support TVEs and the market economy and 
to stimulate economic development because they benefi tted 
directly from increased revenue fl ows. A fourth transition 
institution was anonymous banking which allowed for secret 
(nameless) bank accounts and transactions that deprived 
the state of the information needed to expropriate the gains 
of society’s rich, productive members. Anonymous banking 
was important because it constrained a powerful state 
with few checks on its authority. It also preserved private 
incentives to save, invest and produce in a legal context 
that had no private guarantees of property and hence no 
guarantees that entrepreneurs would enjoy the fruits of 
innovation and effort.
 These, then, are some of the key instruments used by 
Chinese reformers to effect deep institutional reform while 
avoiding social confl ict. “These institutions work because 
they achieve the two objectives at the same time — they 
improve economic effi ciency on the one hand, and make 
the reform compatible for those in power on the other” 
(Qian 2005: 305). Their ability to serve both functions 
makes them superior (for the Chinese case) to other more 
orthodox, textbook-style solutions that have been tried in 
many transition and developing countries, where reformers 
have tried to leap directly to “cutting edge” institutional 
forms, with much less success. 
 There are several important lessons that China teaches 
us. The fi rst is that we should study not the fi nal destination 
we wish to achieve but rather feasible paths towards it. 
“Optimal” solutions that are politically unattainable are 
of little use. Secondly, institutional reform is fi endishly 
complex, especially where it intersects with economic growth 
and development. One need go no further than TVEs, 
which have their roots in the collectivization of agriculture 
in China, a direct precursor of the great famine of 1959-61. 
In the 1970s wave of rural industrialization, they proved 
moderately successful as a means of organizing production. 
But they became phenomenally successful in the 1980s as 
an engine of growth, and a driving force for market reform, 
in the ways described above — one institutional form, one 
country, three utterly different outcomes. 
 The problem of institutional reform has no magic 
solutions, no silver bullets. Complementary changes are 
often required for particular organizational forms to 
become benefi cial. What these complementary changes are, 
and how precisely they should be phased in, are problems 
for which there is usually no obvious solution. Hence trial 
and error — something at which the Chinese have excelled 
— are key. Because there is no foolproof way to design a 
particular institution, reformers are far better off sticking 
to gradual reform and a practical empiricism. 
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Conclusions
 What lessons can we draw from these theoretical and 
empirical analyses for the case of Colombia? The easiest 
lesson is that while the hoped-for end of violence is likely 
to be good for growth and development, the magnitude and 
persistence of such effects cannot be predicted. Nor can 
the effects of the raft of specifi c reforms (e.g. of pensions, 
taxes, fi nancial supervision, fi scal relations) advocated by 
Colombian analysts, the IMF and others in the name of 
“seizing the peace.” As we saw above, economic growth is 
not a linear process, and the effects of specifi c measures can 
differ by country and across time. 
 But the institutional literature gives us signifi cant insight 
into the determinants of long-term growth. Institutions that 
support sustained growth and high levels of development 
are the ones that guarantee civic and political rights, as well 
as property rights, and do so extensively and inclusively 
for essentially all of their citizens. Such institutions raise 
the long-term development performance of a country by 
harnessing the energies, resources and inspiration of all its 
citizens to help overcome the nation’s economic and political 
challenges. 
 The evidence from China and India implies that 
Colombia can accelerate its growth and development through 
sustained investments in education and infrastructure 
and a sustained and progressive inclusion of Colombia’s 
population in the benefi ts of such investments. No longer 
should Colombians be satisfi ed with their “internal frontier,” 
which divides a modern, prosperous urban nation from 
a backwards, forgotten rural hinterland. The experience 
of China argues for extensive human and physical capital 
investments that serve the dual purpose of increasing the 
productive base and drawing more citizens into the national 
economic and political life. Such reforms should be pursued 
not only because they comprise laudable social goals in and 
of themselves but because they will also support Colombian 
growth and development into the long term.
Jean-Paul Faguet is an associate professor of Political Economy 
of Development at the London School of Economics and a 
visiting scholar at CLAS. 
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